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Ben, the lawyer is enaaged
16the special kind of
lawmaking that respects
certain iwl~lnentsmade by
others. This mans that
virtually all the inielleetual
and maral capacities and
virtues appropriate ta
lawmaking af this kind are
called upon in nearly every
aspect of his daily life. One
could hardly imagine a richer
life, or one more naturally
public and &c in its nature.
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af the term, to one's

on

ano&erI equally intemting and,
impomt: the need to claim mp!mingFQ#. ,
our shared experience. Thus
, elected pdhtidan, or tandidate
for office, saying
"This is how we
we got here; this is what we need."In
doing this he tells a story of the polity, .
giving it both a chamcta and a role iri a
naor~tivd,and he gives the,sto
a
meaning: "America: the land o &quality,"
or "opportunity"; "Binnhgham: the city
University:
of steel," or Ytditiin";
center of research" or "teachingngn
The
activities of public life in this way meet
our need to claim meaning for our
existence, not only as individuals but a$ a
larger community; and they do this not
only when we agree wjth the meanings
, claimed, and fmd them comfortable,but
also at the worst and most awful,
moments in our shared life: wheh a " '
tyrant comes to power, for example, or
someone startsa divil war. The need ao
claim meaning for experience is not
inherently benign, that is, but a fom of
human nature capable of great good
or evil.
What is true-in this general way about
public action is true in specific and smnl
ways in the life of the lawyer, and it is
about this that I mainly wish to speak.
The lawyer is perpetually claiming
meshing, both for the events with which
she deals and for the law itself. In the
former case, she faces the intractable
" tension between the hard reality of
human experience and the necessarily
inadequate languages into whichhitis her
task to translate it, a challenge worthy of
any mind. In the latter case, when
decidmg what the law should mean, she
must put herself in the special position
that the law offers those who construe it,
namely that of one who when he reads
law, makes law.
For reading a statute or opinion
m o t be reduced to a process of reading
commands, as a political subordinate
reads the orders of his superior, since the
meaning of the law is not simply there, in
the texts; rather, it must be construed by
the lawyers, in light of larger purposes
and values. And the process af
construction is not a matter simply of
determining legislative will, as though
one could see through the words to such
a thing, but takes q k e a different form:
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In the case of a statute the question is not
"what the legislature intended," but "what
his statute should be taken to mean,"
given not only the words of the statute
and whatever legislative history exists,
but the whole fabric of prior law,
including other legislation, the common
law background against which it was
assumed to be written, fundamental
commitments of value in constitutional
documents and in other texts construing
them, and so forth. The legal text in this
way always calls upon its reader to
integrate its meaning with the other texts
that make up the law; this means that the
smallest or most trivial case may present
the lawyer with the opportunity of
speaking to the very largest questions of
public meaning and value.
If a crucial part of the life of civic
responsibility is the making of laws, it is
important to see that the lawyer engages
in chis activity all the time. Every time
she construes a piece of legislation, an
opinion, a regulation, or a contract, she is
participating in the making of law, and
this is equally true when she argues a
case, when she decides it as a judge, or
when she advises her client that the law
permits or forbids a certain course of
conduct.
On the other hand, it is important to
see that the work of the lawyer in reading
and making law cannot be reduced to
mere policy judgments either, for in the
law no choice is wholly free of constraint.
Every actor must ask himself not only
what he thinks the best result would be
(or the best policy); he must ask to what
judgments authoritatively made by others
he must accord respect, and why It is
not simply the question, "How should
this case be decided?" that he must
answer as judge, then, or to which he
must argue as lawyer, but - parallel to
the question he must ask in reading a
statute - "How should this case be
decided, given this array of prior cases,
legislation, constitutional provisions, and
the like?" each of which must be read and
construed.

In both the identification of texts and
their constn~ction,then, the lawyer is
engaged in the special kind of lawmaking
that respects certain judgments made by
others. This means that virtually all the
intellectual and moral capacities and
virtues appropriate to lawmaking of this
kind are called upon in nearly every
aspect of his daily life. One could hardly
imagine a richer life, or one more
naturally public and civic in its nature,
than that offered by a profession in which
one constantly gves meaning not only to
the immediate experience of others but to
our shared past and present. In doing this
one in fact gives "meaning," in another
sense of the term. to one's own life.

Yet when we ask our students how
they imagme their futures, or when we
talk to our graduates about what they do,
we often hear a different story, marked by
a note of discouragement or disappointment. One question is why Part of the
answer, no doubt, lies in the commercialization of law practice, by whch I mean a
professional life in which attention is
focused not on the meaning of what the
lawyer is actually doing, as a lawyer, so
much as upon the market for his senices.
This in turn reflects a larger reconception
of the nature of human life, especially our
shared life, as an essentially economic
activity, a process often described as one
in which self-interested actors rationally
pursue their goals, seelung to gratifj~
whatever tastes or preferences they bring
to the process. Thus success for the
nation is measured in terms of GNP,not
human flourishing or human rights; the
student in the university is imagined as a
customer, whose felt needs or desires it is
our task to gratify, rather than as a person
who needs an education; and medicine is
conceived of as the "deliveqy of
something called "health care senices,"
rather than as a profession devoted to
giving sick people proper medical
attention - all as though the meaning of
what we do can be reduced to a
commodity transferred for money Of
course there is an economic element in
each of the situations I desciibe above,
and an econon~icanalysis of them may be
fruitful; but there is also more than that,

and that "more" is crucial to the value
and meaning of the activity in question.
We do ourselves a disservice when we
allow one feature of our experience, and
one language, to dominate others; in
particular we erode our capacity to meet
the need that public life and the
professions partly exist to satisfy, the
need to claim adequate meaning for our
shared existence.
In the law the process of
deprofessionalization I describe is also
fed, I think, by the modern law school,
when it focuses so exclusir~elyupon the
law as a set of policy choices, themselves
frequently cast in economic terms. What
I have characterized as the central feature
of the lawyer's life, the claiming of
meaning through the reading of
authoritative texts, was once the center of
a legal education; but L
i is no longer; and
one consequence of the shift is that we
are no longer training our students to see
and realize the possibilities for
meaningful action and life that are
present at the center of the profession
they have chosen.
In fact, the lawyer's professional
judgments cannot be reduced to
economic form, or to economic analysis,
and this for two reasons: first, because
economics has no way to respect
authority external to itself, which is the
root of legal thought; second, because law
concerns itself in large part with what
economics takes for granted, namely,
what economists call the fonnation of
"taste" or "preferences" - and what
others call the fundamental questions of
individual and collective human life:
what we should value, who we should
be. As a method oi analysis, economics
assumes that those choices have been
made; it then pursues the question how
they can be harmonized or otherwise
interact to mutual benefit. But here are
questions prior to economics, questions
of value and being, that it cannot address,
and these are central to every legal
argument.
I think, then, that the true nature and
possibilities of legal practice are to some
extent obscured both by the dominant
economic conception of our shared life

and by the dominant focus in our law
schools on law as policy, rather than on
law as the art of making choices that are
at once partly constrained and guided by
an authoritative culture, partly open to
our present judgment.
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How, under these circumstances, is
law as a profession properly to be taught?
Not without economics, or politics, or
psychology, or history for all have much
to contribute to legal thought and debate;
but not as if any of these disciplines
could simply be extended to take the
place of law. Rather, law should be taught
as a discipline of thought and argument
with its own structure, its own elements,
at the center of which is the activity of
claiming meaning for human experience,
at both the individual and collective level,
and doing so in a language that is at once
a source of authority and itself subject to
perpetual revision. It can best be taught 1
think through a revived case method; one
in which the case is seen not, as Langdell
apparently thought, as a particular
instance to be scientifically subsumed
under a general rule, but in an even more
old-fashioned way: as a lund of
prospective apprenticeship, in which the
student learns by doing. What the
lawyer will face in her professional life is
a series of cases, after all; a legal
education can be conceived of as training
her how to deal with cases, which, if
looked at clearly enough, almost
invariably have a quality of freshness or
newness, testing the adequacy of prior
formulations and calling for present
invention. They involve her directly in
the process described above, of claiming
meaning for experience in an
authoritative language that is made by
others but open to transformation at her
hands. What she can learn is the kind of
complex thought and argument, at once
general and particular, at once
interpretive and creative, at once
respectful of the past and responsive to
the present, that characterizes the law at
its best.

Everything I have said is related to
meaning in the second sense in which I
have used the term, the meaning of a
professional life. In this connection I want
to make the point that the satisfactions I
am describing are in principle available
throughout the profession, not merely in
certain elite firms. In fact, I think the life
of the small city or small-town lawyer
offers remarkable possibilities along the
lines I have suggested. Here one can
make a decent living; maintain
professional standards; live and work
with many of the same people, both as
lawyers and as clients, over a liletime;
serve one's community in various explicit
ways, perhaps on a school board or
zoning commission; have a place in one's
church or synagogue; have a real relation
with one's spouse and children; and in
doing all of this engage powerfully in the
processes by which the community
claims meaning for its experience. A rich
life of many dimensions, public and
private. Of course, this life is not for
everyone, and some big firms and big
cities offer unique opportunities of other
lunds; but the life I describe does seem to
me a good one.
If I am right, why do our students not
line up for the kind of life I describe
above, especially when it seems to fit with
many of their own values? Part of it, I
think, has to do with their socialization:
they have so far proceeded from
prestigous institution to prestigious
institution, and this is the model on
which it is natural for them to take the
next step. To do anything else is for some
of them literally unthinkable. Part of it,
too, is once more the fault of the law
schools, for all too often we encourage
our students to imagne the practice of
law hierarchically, with certain big firms
in certain big cities at the top, smaller
firms in smaller towns near the bottom.
This is most unfortunate, I think, because
it leads our students towards practices
that may not fit with their own values,
and often without their considering the
alternatives at all.
But there is also something larger,
namely the nature of experience in a mass
media age. People sometimes choose the
big city I think, because it has an
existence in what might be called "the
news," and the big firm for parallel
reasons, because it has an existence in the
professional news. If I go to Los Angeles

or Chicago I am going to a place
everyone has heard of; of course they
have not heard of me, but that does not
matter; I identify with the team I have
joined. I think it used to be different, and
suspect that in the South it still is. People
used to think that where they came from
was real, and mattered, and was as full of
the drama of life as any other place,
maybe fuller; that it too had wise people
and fools, saints and evil ones, and real
possibilities for life. People used to think,
that is, that their own experience was real
and that it mattered. If there is an
educational task we should take seriously,
it is helping our students conceive of
their own experience, and that of other
individual human beings, as real and
important.
The dissipated sense of the reality of
one's own experience may be at work in
the practice of law itself, and in a way
that is connected to the commercialization
described above. It used to be quite
common for the lawyer to think of
himself as very different from his clients;
it was to his profession, as much as to his
clients, that his loyalties extended. Now
lawyers all too often seem to imagine
themselves as simply selling services in a
world in which the customer is king.
Instead of feeling that they in some ways
elevate the experience of their clients, as
they translate it into the language of the
law and claim for it a new kind of
meaning, they often feel that they reduce
the law, and what it could mean, to a
system of manipulation. In doing so they
lose much of what a profession means.
For a comparison, think of the
transport of goods for sale: what could be
more plainly a business, merely
commercial, than that? Yet think also of
the magnificent world of meaning that
Joseph Conrad and others have been able
to make out of the life of the sea, which
was, from an economic point of view,
simply the transport of goods.

The law is transformative. It acts upon
certain material - the problem or
dispute or trouble brought by the client
to the lawyer -which has one principle
of organization and intelligibility, and
converts it into something that has to be
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n the development of
such capacities which lieat the
of
the profession Of the law
-there is ground for
hope that some of the
less than satisfactory
tendencies of our world
can be resisted. For
"I have often seen,"
wrote Dante, "a thorn
bush stand fierce and
rigid all winter long,"
as if it were stark and
lifeless; "then, in the
spring, bear a rose
at its crest."

understood in very different ways. In a
case like Cohen v. California (197 I), for
example, it converts a dispute about a
wlgar motto on a jacket into a
consideration of the fundamental nature
of political speech in our society. In
converting its material the law converts
us as well, both speakers and listeners, as
we come to inhabit the world this
language and culture define. Conversion
of this kind is a radical form of human
activity, for which our word is art: we
convert earth and oil into paintings that
may change the imagination; pleasing
sounds into music, not always pleasing,
but sometimes of incredible power and
beauty; human actors and costumes and
words into another dimension of reality,
on the stage, with another claim on our
attention altogether. So in the law: we
convert immediate experience into the
subject of thought of a particular kind,
which has at iti center the question of
meaning: what this event means, and
. ..
. .
- - should mean, in the language oi the law;
and what that language itself means, as a
way in which we articulate our deepest
values and attain collective being. f h e life
that gives meaning in such a way is itself
a life of meaning.
There are deep traditions that conceive
of law in such ways, and we should do
our best to keep them alive. I am
reminded, for example, of Solomon:
when he became King, the Lord appeared
to him in a dream, and said "Ask what I
shall gve thee." Solomon replied: "Give
unto thy servant an understanding heart
to judge thy people, that I may discern
between good and bad." He did not ask
for money, or long life, or the death of his
enemies, but a wise and understanding
heart; or, as Dante puts it when he retells
the story in the Paradiso, he asked not to
know how many spheres there were in
heaven, or whether necessity conditioned
by contingency is true necessity, or
whether one can make a triangle in a
semicircle that does not have a right
angle, but asked for royal prudence,
regal prudenza.
It is important to see that this is a
quality of the individual mind, of
individual experience. "Whenever you are
uncertain," Dante says, "put lead on your
feet, to make you slow to reach either
Yes or No: for a quick judgment often
takes the wrong way; and then the
feelings bind the intellect" - that is, your

capacity for thought is impaired by your
emotional commitment to the decision
you have hastily made.
For a lauyer this is very good advice
indeed. And see what its premise is: that
excellence of judgment is the work of the
whole mind, including the affections,
including the capacity to suspend
conclusion. This in turn means that
excellence of this kind is to be attained
only by the development of individual
mind; not by a mass education, or by the
experience of groups or classes, but
through sustained attention to individual
experience of intellectual and affective
life. In the development of such capacities
- which lie at the heart of the profession
of the law - there is ground for hope
that some of the less than satisfactory
tendencies of our world can be resisted.
For "I have often seen," wrote Dante, "a
thorn bush stand fierce and rigd all
winter long," as if it were stark and
lifeless; "then, in the spring, bear a rose at
its crest."
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